RUNNING HEAD: EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON PREFERENCES FOR SEGREGATION

Not in My School District: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Information on Parental Preferences Regarding School Segregation

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ABSTRACT

Economic school segregation has proven to be a stubbornly persistent feature of public schooling in the United States. In this study, we conduct a nationally representative survey of parents to explore the relationship between beliefs and preferences regarding school segregation. Using experimental manipulation, we test if learning about levels of school segregation in their local school district affects a parent's attitudes towards school segregation. In doing so, our study helps uncover whether disagreement with respect to segregation-reducing policies stems from differences in parental *beliefs* about the extent of segregation in their district or from differences in parental *beliefs* about the extent of segregation. We find that parents hold largely inaccurate beliefs about local segregation levels and on average underestimate the extent to which their school district is economically segregated. However, information treatments that correct inaccurate beliefs do little to influence support for policies to reduce segregation.

School segregation has proven to be a stubbornly persistent feature of the American public schooling system. Despite efforts to reduce racial school segregation in the late 20th century – such as civil rights reforms and a series of court-mandated desegregation orders (some of which are still active today) – it has largely stagnated since the 1980s (Johnson 2015; Reardon and Owens 2014; Stroub and Richards 2013). In contrast, economic school segregation has only grown over the past half-century, largely as a result of rising income inequality (Duncan and Murnane 2011; Owens, Reardon, and Jencks 2016). In the United States today, the average poor student attends a school with about 70% poor students, whereas the average non-poor student attends a school with less than 40% poor students.¹ School segregation is associated with increased funding disparities between students (Weathers and Sosina 2022), larger achievement gaps (Owens et al. 2016; Reardon 2016; Reardon et al. 2019), and lower rates of upward social mobility (Johnson 2019).

While Americans report concerns about growing rates of school segregation (Center for American Progress 2017), segregation continues to rise, in part, because of their behavior; parents self-segregate, both implicitly and explicitly, across race and income into different neighborhoods and schools (Billingham and Hunt 2016; Goyette and Lareau 2014; Hailey 2021; Roda and Wells 2013), highlighting the friction between self-reported preferences and actual behavior. This apparent contradiction between stated concerns and behaviors is perhaps not surprising; Americans also voice concern about rising income inequality while simultaneously pushing back against policies for economic redistribution (Mijs 2019; Trump 2017). Indeed, past

¹ Author calculations using SEDA 4.0 data (Reardon et al. 2021). Definitions of economic disadvantage in the Stanford Education Data Archive (SEDA) are drawn from the Common Core of Data (CCD), where poor is defined using free- or reduced-price lunch eligibility.

research has painted a complicated picture of beliefs and preferences² regarding inequality in the United States; while some studies indicate that Americans are ignorant of rising inequality, others instead suggest that Americans are not unaware but rather ambivalent or tolerant towards it (McCall 2013).

And yet, little is known about beliefs and preferences regarding contemporary economic school segregation, a key feature of the American educational system which shapes the experiences of millions of children. On one hand, it is possible that differences in parental preferences regarding school segregation are due to incorrect beliefs about local levels of segregation (even if parents might in theory support the goal of reducing segregation broadly). This may imply that, if not for relative ignorance of the high levels of school segregation in their district, parents might be more critical of increasingly segregated school systems. On the other hand, increased knowledge about segregation may be largely irrelevant to parents' general attitudes and policy preferences regarding economically segregated schools. This would suggest that segregation is maintained in part due to a general tolerance of segregated schools by parents.

Stratification beliefs are consequential because they impact tolerances for inequality and appetites for change (Kluegel and Smith 1986; McCall 2013). By understanding the mechanisms which shape such beliefs, we can better understand the processes that produce inequality. In this paper, we build on prior theoretical and empirical research on preferences regarding segregated schools (Billingham and Hunt 2016; Goyette and Lareau 2014) and the ways in which status, context, and information impact beliefs about inequality (Hunt 2007; Kuziemko et al. 2015;

² Throughout the paper, we use the terms beliefs and perceptions to refer to a person's descriptive understanding of the current state of the world. Importantly, beliefs and perceptions can be either accurate or inaccurate. For example, a person who believes that their district has no segregation, when it is, in fact, highly segregated, holds an inaccurate belief (or misperception). On the other hand, we use the terms attitudes and preferences to refer to a person's normative views about which hypothetical or actual states of the world are desirable; these are subjective and therefore cannot be evaluated as inherently accurate or inaccurate. For example, a person believing that the world would be improved if segregation was reduced has a preference for (and a positive attitude towards) desegregation.

McCall 2013; Mijs and Hoy 2021) by examining the factors shaping contemporary American parents' attitudes around within-district economic school segregation.³

To do so, we fielded a nationally representative survey with both descriptive and experimental components to empirically explore the processes that produce parental beliefs about and attitudes towards school segregation. More specifically, we investigate the following research questions: (1) How do beliefs and preferences regarding school segregation vary as a function of key individual demographic characteristics? (2) To what extent do parents hold accurate beliefs about the levels of school segregation in their district? (3) Does providing parents with information on the local levels and consequences of school segregation affect their attitudes and preferences regarding school segregation?

We first examine American parents' baseline attitudes and policy preferences, in addition to the extent to which they hold accurate beliefs about levels of local school segregation. Because an individual's lived experience of segregation and inequality is shaped by their race, gender, and education, among other attributes (Hunt 2007; Kane and Kyyrö 2001; Merolla, Hunt, and Serpe 2011; Wilson et al. 2021), we descriptively explore both the beliefs and preferences of Americans overall and differences in such beliefs and preferences across key demographic groups. For example, given that low- and high-income individuals live in school districts with

³ We limit our focus to local within-district school segregation for three main reasons. First, parents typically make educational decisions for their children in a local context (e.g., selecting a neighborhood, school, or district within in a given metro, rather than selecting across metro areas). Second, from a policy perspective, efforts to reduce school segregation within districts are likely the "lowest-hanging fruit," as the costs of reallocating students to schools within a district are less than the costs of reallocating students to different districts within a state. Third, school segregation is strongly influenced by a district's school attendance boundary policy, which is responsive to local parental preferences, as parents exert political pressure on district administrators (Einstein and Kogan 2016; Monarrez 2021; Saporito and Van Riper 2016). Policymakers more generally are also most responsive to the preferences and politics of advantaged, affluent families (Gilens 2014). In addition, though previously-enacted desegregation policies aimed at reducing racial segregation have been shown to have produced remarkable progress for racial educational equity (Johnson 2019), such policies remain politically contentious and rely on the support and compliance of White and affluent parents, who are prone to misconceptions about these program's efficacy (Pride 2000).

differing levels of economic school segregation (Mijs and Roe 2021; Owens et al. 2016), we might also expect that they have different attitudes towards school segregation on average. Next, we experimentally test the malleability of attitudes and preferences regarding economic school segregation using an information treatment that provides each parent with individually tailored information on levels of school segregation in their local school district as well as a brief research note on the negative consequences of school segregation for poor children. This approach allows us to empirically adjudicate between competing possibilities on American ignorance of or tolerance towards local levels of economic school segregation.

We find that parents systematically underestimate the degree to which economic school segregation exists in their local school districts. While the plurality of parents believe that they live in a school district with little to no school segregation, in fact only about half of these parents actually live in such a district. Despite these misperceptions, receiving information on the actual levels and consequences of school segregation in one's district does little to nothing to affect support for segregation-reducing policies. Put differently, though public perceptions of school segregation are inaccurate, correcting misperceptions alone is unlikely to create meaningful change in public opinion. In addition, we find that parents substantially vary in their attitudes and preferences regarding segregation-reducing policies, but on average demonstrate little concern on the issue of local economic school segregation, consistent with a framework of American tolerance towards inequality. The median respondent is willing to support only very small increases in taxes and school travel time in order to further desegregation efforts. From a policy perspective, the average respondent's contribution is much less than what would be required to meaningfully reduce school segregation. However, the significant heterogeneity in stratification beliefs and preferences among respondents is explained, in part, by differences

across demographic groups. For example, we find marked differences in both the accuracy of parents' beliefs and their baseline segregation-related preferences by education, income, and political party.

BACKGROUND

A large body of literature has sought to explain how and why parents choose segregated schools. However, comparatively less is known about parental beliefs about levels of local school segregation, and how these beliefs are translated into preferences. To put this study in context, we first review literature on the choice of segregated schools. Though our experiment focuses specifically on economic school segregation, we also draw upon literatures on racial segregation, Americans' perceptions of inequality, and how information treatments affect individual preferences.

Choosing Economically Segregated Schools

Parental choices, preferences, and beliefs play a large role in structuring the economic makeup of children's schools (Billingham and Hunt 2016; Hailey 2021, 2022). Though residential and schooling decisions are made in an individual context, they have cumulative ramifications on the socioeconomic and racial composition of a community's schools. Parents select neighborhoods and schools for their children in part based on the socioeconomic characteristics and public goods associated with them (Goyette and Lareau 2014; Reardon and Bischoff 2011) and search for neighborhoods with quality schools that are still within their financial means (Rhodes and Warkentien 2017). As a result, affluent families tend to avoid high poverty schools (Saporito 2003) and will pay a premium for homes in neighborhoods where the

schools have higher standardized test scores (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Black 1999). This leads to increased economic school segregation, as schools with higher test scores are disproportionately located in more affluent neighborhoods (Owens 2018; Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Moreover, affluent families in neighborhoods with higher levels of poverty tend to take advantage of charter, magnet, or private schools rather than attending local public schools (Pearman and Swain 2017; Saporito 2003). Finally, economic school segregation and racial school segregation are themselves intertwined (Orfield and Lee 2005), so the persistence of racial school segregation in school districts today also contributes to patterns of economic school segregation.

While revealed preferences indicate that they tend to prefer economically segregated schools, parents are often unclear when describing how and why they select specific schools for their children. Decisions about schooling are made in a complex choice environment where not all of the options are apparent or convenient and access to information is stratified by income, race, social networks, and geography (Burdick-Will et al. 2020; Denice and Gross 2016; Schneider and Buckley 2002). When parents are explicitly asked what they value in school systems, they tend to list academic quality and the convenience of the location as the key factors considered (Bell 2007; Holme 2002; Schneider and Buckley 2002). However, these stated considerations largely fail to map onto the ways that parents select schools in practice. For example, parents rarely state the socioeconomic composition of a potential school as a factor driving their choices, yet this appears to be one of the most salient features in school choice (Burdick-Will et al. 2020; Holme 2002; Schneider and Buckley 2002). Moreover, parents – particularly those who are affluent and well-connected– rely heavily on social networks and the opinions of other high-status parents to inform their conceptions of what a "good" school looks

like, irrespective of actual academic quality (Fong 2019; Holme 2002; Rhodes and Warkentien 2017). Access to this knowledge varies by race and class, which in turn structures socioeconomic and racial differences in school selection.

Parental attitudes and preferences also shape policy on a broader scale. Public opinion shapes policy outcomes, and local policy is especially responsive to the preferences of voters (Einstein and Kogan 2016). School boards and district administrators are responsive to parents, even when an individual parents' goals (or the goals of a group of parents) may not align with goals of the district more broadly (Diem, Frankenberg, and Cleary 2015). For example, school attendance boundaries, which structure school segregation within a district, can be subject to change based on the political pressure exerted by parents (Lareau, Weininger, and Cox 2018). In extreme cases, parents can prompt their communities to secede from the broader school district to gain more control over attendance boundaries and other school-related decisions (EdBuild 2019; Wilson 2016).

Finally, parental attitudes and preferences can also affect school segregation indirectly through their impact on the housing and rental markets. The desirability of a given neighborhood influences its price, which in turn determines the types of families who can afford to live in that neighborhood. The unequal and uneven distribution of income and wealth has led to dramatic differences in the cost of living across neighborhoods and metropolitan areas (Chetty et al. 2020; Diamond 2016; Goyette and Lareau 2014; Manduca 2018; Rhodes and Warkentien 2017). As a result, rich and poor children tend to live in very different neighborhoods, and, by construction, in very different school districts. About 70% of U.S. schoolchildren attend their zoned public schools (U.S. Department of Education 2019), highlighting the powerful effect that economic neighborhood segregation has on economic school segregation.

Perceptions of School Segregation & Inequality

Most American parents consider economic school segregation to be a pressing problem, but nonetheless such segregation continues to rise due, in part, to parental choices (Center for American Progress 2017; Reardon and Owens 2014; Roda and Wells 2013). This apparent contradiction between reported preferences and behaviors underscores the possibility that parents may have an inaccurate understanding of the magnitude of segregation in their local schools, even if they in theory support the goals of desegregation. At the same time, parents may simply have preferences regarding segregated schooling that are unrelated to levels of school segregation.

Prior research illustrates that parents also may have an inaccurate understanding of the effectiveness of desegregation efforts for reducing social and economic inequality. Though Americans support diverse and integrated schools in the abstract, they express strong disapproval of many policies intended to reduce segregation, with busing in particular receiving intense pushback (Hochschild and Scott 1998; Pride 2000). Many desegregation programs, like busing, have been widely perceived as a failure by parents (Pride 2000), but recent research leveraging quasi-experimental methods has shown just the opposite; court-ordered desegregation policies were remarkably successful in improving long-run educational, social, and economic outcomes for Black children, without negative consequences for White children (Johnson 2015, 2019).

Our study is situated within a broader body of research on the effects of information treatments in prompting individuals to update their beliefs and change their preferences (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013; Haaland and Roth 2021; Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim 2017; Kuklinski et al. 2000; Kuziemko et al. 2015; McCall et al. 2017; Mijs and Hoy 2021). However,

experimental evidence from prior studies is mixed with respect to if (and when) correcting inaccurate beliefs affects attitudes and policy preferences. These studies are best understood in the context of two competing theories on American attitudes towards inequality: ignorance versus tolerance (McCall 2013). Under an ignorance framework, Americans are largely unaware of inequality levels but would otherwise be critical of inequality if their perceptions matched reality. In contrast, if Americans are tolerant of inequality, we would not expect the act of correcting misperceptions to induce meaningful shifts in preferences. To distinguish between these possibilities, it is critical to understand both the extent to which individuals hold accurate beliefs about levels of inequality, as well as whether preferences for reducing inequality can be changed by updating misperceptions.

When considering several forms of inequality, Americans on average tend to underestimate current levels of income inequality (Hauser and Norton 2017; Kuziemko et al. 2015), overestimate social mobility (Kraus and Tan 2015), and overestimate their own incomes relative to the national income distribution (Cruces et al. 2013). As with economic inequality, Americans underestimate the extent to which racial inequality still exists today and overestimate racial progress since the civil rights era (Kraus et al. 2019; Onyeador et al. 2020). Consistent with the ignorance framework, however, several studies have found that information treatments increase both concerns about inequality and preferences for policies to reduce it (Cruces et al. 2013; Karadja et al. 2017; McCall et al. 2017). In contrast, other studies, such as Kuziemko et al. (2015) and Kuklinski et al. (2000), found that information does little to move preferences or support for redistribution policies, consistent with a tolerance perspective where individuals – even if unaware of inequality – are unlikely to be critical of it.

What might explain these apparently contradicting results? Views and responses to information tend to be context specific (McCall 2013; Mijs and Hoy 2021), and the context of previous experiments has differed in meaningful ways. While some studies have used informational stimuli that provide respondents tailored individual-level information regarding their *own* rank in the income distribution (Cruces et al. 2013; Karadja et al. 2017), others have instead used stimuli that provide information on the overall levels of societal inequality (Kuziemko et al. 2015; McCall et al. 2017).

Importantly, however, inequality beliefs and responses are issue-specific, so inequality views in one domain (e.g., income inequality) may not necessarily translate to another (e.g., school segregation). Respondents may also react to information about inequality in surprising ways. For example, though researchers may expect that learning about rising income inequality would elicit preferences for governmental redistribution, in reality respondents may express these views through other channels, such as preferences for increased educational spending (McCall 2013) or through a more general updating in beliefs but not policy preferences (Haaland and Roth 2021). This suggests that Americans may have ambivalent feelings about inequality rather than neatly corresponding to either ignorance or tolerance frameworks (McCall 2013).

Finally, Americans are heterogenous in their beliefs about inequality generally and segregation specifically (Kluegel and Smith 1986). For example, perhaps unsurprisingly, racial minorities have different perceptions of and views on inequality than White individuals (Hunt 1996, 2007; Kane and Kyyrö 2001). Likewise, views differ by gender (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; Kane and Kyyrö 2001), education (Kane and Kyyrö 2001; Newman, Johnston, and Lown 2015), social class (Newman et al. 2015), and context (Merolla et al. 2011; Newman et al. 2015). These differences may reflect differences across social groups in experiences of

inequality and advantage. However, the extent to which demographic position is associated with how informed parents of school-aged children are about local school segregation remains relatively unexplored.

Study Contribution

Given the mixed empirical evidence, it is not immediately clear how attitudes and preferences for school segregation may shift in response to new information (i.e., the receipt of accurate information on local levels of school segregation). If people are unaware of the extent to which schools are segregated - particularly in their own local contexts where they could potentially advocate for segregation-reducing policies either through direct action or local politics - providing them with accurate information could change their general attitudes and policy preferences.⁴ In this case, if not for their misconceptions of the prevalence of school segregation, parents would be critical of this inequality (i.e., an ignorance perspective). Alternatively, it may be that parents tend to have the same preferences for segregation regardless of local levels of school segregation (i.e., a tolerance perspective). These competing theoretical possibilities – that preferences are driven either by ignorance or tolerance of local school segregation - form the basis of the experimental portion of our study. In addition, our descriptive results examine accuracy and heterogeneity in beliefs about segregation, which likely vary by demographic background, education, and political affiliation. As discussed above, parental beliefs and preferences regarding school segregation are consequential because they play an important role in shaping school segregation in communities and on a broader policy scale.

⁴ We use general attitudes to refer to a parent's overall normative orientation towards an issue (e.g., whether they believe that segregation should be reduced or that segregation is an important social problem). We define policy preferences as attitudes towards specific policies designed to reduce school segregation (e.g., school assignment policies or magnet schools).

METHODS

In the spring of 2021, we conducted a survey experiment where participants were randomly assigned to either an informational treatment about school segregation or a control condition. In this way, we tested if information about local levels of segregation and the consequences associated with school segregation has a causal effect on participants' attitudes and preferences regarding school segregation and/or policies that might reduce it. Prior to conducting the experiment, we preregistered the hypotheses, experimental design and items, and analysis plan.⁵

Participants

We recruited paid participants from Lucid, an online survey platform used widely in academic research. Experiments fielded on Lucid have been shown to yield similar results to those fielded with other nationally representative survey samples (Coppock and McClellan 2019). Given our interest in understanding parental beliefs and preferences regarding school segregation, we used Lucid to recruit a nationally-representative sample of parents with schoolaged children. Lucid provided zip codes for each survey respondent, which we used to link each parent to the level of within-district economic school segregation of their local school district. We operationalize economic school segregation as the within-district nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to poor students (where poor is defined using free- or reduced-price lunch eligibility) derived using school enrollment information from the Common Core of Data.

Demographic variables, including age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, and education, are included with the Lucid survey panel (and are used as controls in our regression

⁵ The preregistration document can be found at the following link: <u>https://osf.io/ucvt6</u>

specifications). Our original sample included 1720 survey respondents. Because the demographic measures were collected by Lucid directly when forming the panel, there is no missingness along the demographic measures or zip codes. However, when we linked these data to district characteristics from the Stanford Education Data Archive (SEDA), a small number of respondents had missing data school district covariates such as district enrollment or demographics (97 respondents; 5 percent). We dropped these respondents for a resulting analytic sample of 1,623 respondents.⁶ Descriptive statistics of our survey sample are displayed in Table 1. Covariates are balanced across treatment and control groups across race/ethnicity, income, age, political party, education, and region.

[Table 1]

Experimental Design

Figure 1 provides an overview of the experimental design for this study. All experimental survey items can be found in Section A2 of the appendix. Following a short description of school segregation, we asked participants about their perception of the level of economic school segregation in their local district using intuitive images illustrating different amounts of school segregation. Respondents were then randomly assigned to either the information treatment condition or the control condition in roughly equal proportions. Respondents in the treatment were then provided with of information on the approximate level of school segregation in their zip code and a short note about the consequences of school segregation. In particular, respondents were told that there are large and persistent consequences of school segregation for low-income children, but also that high-income children's academic pursuits do not appear to be associated with segregation levels (based on research by Quillian (2014)). Because we

⁶ Results are virtually identical when we inclusion the dropped cases as a robustness check (see Appendix Table 2).

simultaneously provide two pieces of information, we cannot disentangle the effects of information on local segregation levels from information on the consequences of segregation. However, we opted to include both pieces of information to strengthen the experimental treatment.

[Figure 1]

Participants in both the treatment and control conditions then answered identical questions on their general attitudes and policy preferences regarding economic school segregation. These included a set of questions on both general attitudes towards school segregation (i.e., *"How important of an issue do you think the reduction of school segregation is in your local area?"*) and on specific hypothetical policy proposals (i.e., *"How likely are you to support changing attendance boundaries to reduce school segregation?"*). A goal of our experiment was to provide accurate and understandable information to the parent respondents, who are likely not well versed in the complex methods that researchers use to conceptualize and measure school segregation. Thus, following previous studies using information treatments to measure changes in attitudes and preferences (e.g., Cruces et al., 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015), we opted to use a relatively simple and straightforward display of segregation rather than a more nuanced or technical illustration. Figure 2 shows the question in which respondents were asked to guess their local levels of school segregation.

[Figure 2]

Matching Zip Codes to Segregation Levels

A key feature of our survey is the way in which we link each parent to information regarding the level of economic school segregation in their local school district. However, we do

not directly observe the school district that each parent lives within. Instead, Lucid provided us the zip code of residence for each parent in our survey sample. We linked each parent's zip code to a school segregation database as they completed the survey, allowing us to display information specific to each respondent in real time.

Unfortunately, in the United States, many zip codes intersect with multiple school districts. Hereafter, we refer to each unique geographic intersection between a zip code and a school district as simply a 'zip-district intersection'. Table A1 in the appendix provides a tabulation of the estimated number of parents nationwide living in zip codes with various numbers of unique zip-district intersections. Ignoring very small and sparsely populated zip-district intersections, 44% of parents live in zip codes that are completely encapsulated within a single school district. The remaining 56% of parents live in zip codes that intersect with two or more school districts. When a zip code intersects with more than one district, we must assign that zip code to a single school district in order to provide local school segregation information. We assign each zip code to the school district of the intersection estimated to contain the greatest number of parents of public school children (which is therefor the district that a survey respondent living in a given zip code is most likely to reside in).

To estimate the number of parents living in each zip-district intersection, we used survey data from the 2019-2013 and 2014-2018 versions of the American Community Survey (ACS; U.S. Census Bureau 2019). We combined ACS survey data with information on the geographic boundaries of all zip codes and school districts, taken from the U.S. Census Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTA; U.S. Census Bureau 2010) data and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Education Demographic and Geographic Estimates (EDGE; National Center for Education Statistics 2019) data, respectively. We began with the ZCTA-EDGE geographic

relationship file, a dataset of all zip-district intersections. For each school district, we drew estimates of the number of parents with children enrolled in public school using ACS school district tabulations from 2009 through 2018. We then divided the number of parents by the land area of each district, thereby calculating an estimate of the population density of parents in each school district. Next, we merged our school district population density estimate onto the universe of zip-district intersections. Lastly, we multiplied school district population density by the land area of each zip-district intersection, which yields an estimate of the number of parents living in each zip-district intersection.⁷ For zip codes that intersect with school districts, we assigned them to the school district of the zip-district intersection containing the greatest estimated number of parents of public school children.

To calculate the accuracy of our zip code to school district crosswalk, we divided the estimated number of parents living in a zip code's assigned school district by the total number of parents who live in a zip code. Our method is quite accurate – an estimated 86% of parents were assigned to the correct school district. Figure A1 in the appendix displays a histogram of the fraction of parents who live in a given zip code expected to be correctly assigned to their school district using the method described above.

Once each zip code is assigned to a single school district, we matched zip codes to the local levels of economic school segregation. We operationalize economic school segregation as the within-district nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to poor students. To visually display this segregation level to survey respondents, we coarsened each district's continuous segregation value to one of six segregation bins, illustrated in Figure 2 in the previous section. Though only 86% of parents are expected to be assigned to the correct school district via their zip code, 93%

⁷ This strategy assumes a relatively even distribution of parents throughout school districts.

of all parents are expected to be assigned to the correct binned segregation category (and another 5% of parents are assigned to a category one away from their true category). This is due to the correlation in economic school segregation between neighboring school districts combined with the fact that coarsening segregation obscures some underlying differences between the segregation levels in a parent's true versus assigned segregation. Figure A2 in the appendix displays a histogram of the absolute value of the expected difference between a parent's true versus assigned segregation category. The correlation between a parent's true and assigned segregation category is 0.94, validating the accuracy of our zip code to school district matching approach.

Outcome Variables

To measure a parent's general attitudes and policy preferences for reducing school segregation, we construct two indices using principal components analysis. The first index is a composite of four questions that aim to capture a respondent's general attitude regarding the importance of school segregation as an issue. The second index is a composite of five questions that aim to capture a parent's support for specific policy proposals intended to reduce school segregation. The survey questions underlying our indices can be found in Section A2 of the appendix and are summarized in Figure 1.⁸ Each index is the first principal component score of the relevant survey questions, standardized within sample using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. The first principal component explains 67% and 70% of the response variation of the underlying general attitude and policy survey questions, respectively. In addition, we measured two continuous outcomes which have substantively meaningful unit interpretations:

⁸ The general attitudes index is constructed using Questions 3, 12, 13, 15. The policy preferences index is constructed using Questions 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14.

the number of additional minutes that a respondent might allow their child to travel to school to reduce local within-district school segregation, and additional tax (in dollars) that a respondent would support to cover the costs of reducing local economic school segregation.

Analytic Strategy

We first descriptively explore variation in our four outcome variables: the attitude index, the policy preference index, willingness for their child to travel additional minutes to school, and willingness to support increased taxes to reduce school segregation. To do so, we estimate linear regression models that include a variety of individual-level and school district-level variables as covariates.

$$y_{id} = \beta_0 + X_i \gamma + D_d \delta + \varepsilon_{id} \qquad [1]$$

In Equation 1, y_{id} is one of our four outcome variables for respondent *i* in district *d*, X_i is a vector of individual-level covariates, and D_d is a vector of district-level covariates. The individual-level covariates include gender, race/ethnicity age, income, education, political party, and geographic region, and the district-level covariates include school segregation level, percent of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, district enrollment, number of charter schools, per-pupil total expenditure and revenue, and district socioeconomic status.

Next, we use a similar set of descriptive regressions to investigate which individual and district characteristics are related to a parent's beliefs about local segregation, as well of the accuracy of those beliefs.

$$belief_{id} = \beta_0 + X_i \gamma + D_d \delta + \varepsilon_{id} \quad [2a]$$

$$(belief_{id} - actual_d) = \beta_0 + \gamma X_i + \delta D_d + \varepsilon_{id} \quad [2b]$$

In Equations 2a and 2b, $belief_{id}$ is a variable containing a parent's self-reported belief about the levels of economic segregation in their local school district (from one of the six segregation categories displayed in Figure 2), whereas $actual_d$ is a variable containing the actual segregation levels in a parent's district (also from one of the six segregation categories).

Finally, we run a series of regressions designed to determine the impact of our information treatment on responses to survey questions.

$$y_{id} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 treat_{id} + \gamma X_i + \delta D_d + \varepsilon_{id}$$
 [3a]

 $y_{id} = \beta_1 under_{id} + \beta_2 (treat_{id} * under_{id}) + \beta_3 * over_{id} + \beta_4 (treat_{id} * over_{id}) + \gamma X_i + \delta D_d + \varepsilon_{id}$ [3b]

In Equations 3a and 3b, $treat_{id}$ is a dichotomous variable that indicates membership of the treatment group. In Equation 3b, $under_{id}$ is a dichotomous variable that is equal to one when $belief_{id} - actual_d < 0$ and is equal to zero otherwise. Likewise, $over_{id}$ is a dichotomous variable that is equal to one when $belief_{id} - actual_d \ge 0.9$ Thus, Equation 3b allows us to test

⁹ Note that, under this formulation, what we call an "overestimator" includes (i) parents who believed their local school district to be more economically segregated than it in fact is and (ii) parents who accurately guessed the level of segregation in their district. We group these two types of responses together because both should theoretically imply smaller treatment effects of information than "underestimators" (i.e. parents who believed that their district was less segregated than it is in reality).

for heterogeneity based on whether respondents underestimate versus overestimate local school segregation.

RESULTS

In this section, we first present descriptive results exploring variation in parents' general attitudes and policy preferences for reducing school segregation. Next, we investigate the extent to which respondents tend to over or underestimate local levels of segregation, which may drive a portion of the variation in baseline attitudes and preferences. Finally, we present point estimates and substantive evaluations of the causal effect of our information treatment on respondents' attitudes and preferences regarding school segregation (both overall and separately for parents who over versus underestimate segregation in their local district).

Attitudes and Preferences Regarding School Segregation

We begin with our results on parents' baseline attitudes and preferences regarding school segregation. We focus on our analyses using the control group because their attitudes and preferences regarding school segregation and segregation-reducing policies in the United States (see Table 2 and Figure 3 below) could not have been influenced by our informational treatment. Figure 3 illustrates the coefficients from the models with controls from Table 3. Figures A3 and A4 in the appendix provide histograms of our four outcomes variables.

We focus on the models that include both individual and district-level covariates for each of our four outcomes (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Point estimates predicting change in general attitudes and policy preferences (measured by the two indices) are presented in standard

deviation units, while point estimates both for additional minutes of travel time and tax increase increments are presented in minutes and in dollars, respectively.

When considering our policy and attitude indices, we see that a portion of difference across individuals is accounted for by demographic characteristics. First, age is negatively associated with both general attitudes and policy preferences for reducing segregation ($\beta =$ -0.02, p<0.001 for both indices). An increase in average household income is associated with higher support for policy-related outcomes ($\beta = 0.07$, p<0.05). We also observe that individuals with a 4-year degree or a graduate degree or more report higher support for reducing school segregation through attitudes ($\beta = 0.25$, p<0.05 and $\beta = 0.71$, p<0.001, respectively) and policies ($\beta = 0.42$, p<0.01 and $\beta = 0.78$, p<0.001, respectively), relative to individuals without a high school degree. For the policy index, individuals with a high school degree also report more support for segregation-reducing policies than do individuals without a high-school degree $(\beta = 0.30, p < 0.05)$. Finally, we observe heterogeneity by political party: relative to parents who identify as Democrats, parents who identify as Republicans and Independents report about 0.41 SD (p<0.001) and 0.49 SD (p<0.001) less support for reducing segregation in terms of attitudes and 0.39 SD (p<0.001) and 0.50 SD (p<0.001) less support for segregation-reducing policies, respectively. We do not observe significant detectable differences in either the attitude or policy index by race/ethnicity or by U.S. region.

Overall, adjusted r-squared values for the underlying regressions, as can be seen in Table 2, are 0.26 and 0.28, for attitudes and policies, respectively. In other words, we can explain over a quarter of the variation in general attitudes and policy preferences using the sociodemographic covariates alone. We do not observe significant detectable differences in either the attitude or preference index by race/ethnicity or by U.S. region. Notably, adding district-level covariates to

the model does not substantially improve our ability to explain variation in general attitudes and policy preferences, indicating that demographic factors may be more salient than district-level factors in predicting preferences.

There is also meaningful variation in parents' willingness to have their children travel additional minutes to school or to support a tax that might reduce school segregation. For example, a parent at the 25th percentile is not willing to have their child travel any additional minutes to reduce local school segregation, whereas a parent at the 75th percentile is willing to send their kid 10 additional minutes (which represents a roughly 50% increase in travel time). Similarly, a parent at the 25th percentile supports just 5 dollars in additional annual taxes to cover the costs of reducing school segregation, while a parent at the 75th percentile supports a 200 dollar tax increase. However, we do not observe a statistically significant relationship between any of the covariates of interest and these outcomes. In addition, adjusted r-squared values are only 0.006 and 0.04, respectively. These may have higher measurement error, however, as they are measured by fewer survey questions than the indices.

[Figure 3 & Table 2]

Beliefs About School Segregation

Next, we turn to our descriptive results on parental beliefs about school segregation in their local school districts. Regression results in Table 3 indicate how covariates and districtlevel measures are related to perceptions of segregation, net of other factors. As in previous sections, we focus our discussion of the results on columns 2 and 4, which include the models that include both individual and district-level covariates. We first examine the extent to which these measures can explain *perceptions* of levels of local segregation (column 2). No clear patterns emerge in predicting perceptions of segregation, with one exception: Black respondents systematically report beliefs of higher levels of school segregation relative to White respondents ($\beta = 0.40$, p<0.01). We do not observe evidence of a statistically significant relationship between other individual and district-level covariates and perceptions of levels of segregation. In all, individual and district-level measures explain only a very small amount of the total variation in perceptions (adjusted r-squared = 0.01).

[Table 3]

Figure 4 displays two side-by-side histograms of perceptions of school segregation. Panel A displays the distribution of parent perceptions of economic school segregation overlaid on top of the distribution of actual levels of school segregation in those parents' districts. Panel B displays the distribution of differences between a parent's perception and their district's actual segregation levels. As previously noted, there is substantial heterogeneity in the accuracy of parental beliefs about segregation. Only about 17% of respondents correctly identified the school segregation in their local district; this quantity corresponds to the fraction of guesses that would be expected to be correct simply by chance (100/6=16.67). On average, parents underestimate the true approximate amount of school segregation. Moreover, there are interesting nuances beyond the difference in means between the parental beliefs and actual segregation distributions. Perceived segregation exceeds actual segregation at both extremes of the distribution (i.e., Categories A and B, corresponding to little or no segregation, as well as Categories E and F,

corresponding to much or total segregation), whereas actual segregation exceeds perceived segregation in the middle of the segregation distribution (i.e., Categories C and D).

These results emphasize that American parents have a very poor understanding of the extent to which their local school district is economically segregated. Parents most commonly select Category A, corresponding to the belief that there is little to no economic segregation. This result holds true regardless of a parent's gender, race/ethnicity, education levels, household income, and political party.

[Figure 4]

We also explore which sociodemographic measures explain differences in respondents' perceptions of their local levels of school segregation (see column 4 of Table 3 and Figure 5). Column 4 of Table 3 reports results predicting differences between perceived and actual segregation levels and includes both demographic and district-level covariates. Increases in district enrollment are associated with decreases in differences between perceived and actual segregation ($\beta = -0.53$, p<0.001), and increases in charter schools predict slight increases in differences between perceived and actual segregation ($\beta = -0.53$, p<0.001), and increases in charter schools predict slight increases in differences between perceived and actual segregation ($\beta = 0.01$, p<0.01). On the whole, however, most individual and district-level measures are not significantly related to these differences in perceptions and actual segregation levels. In addition, the model that includes district-level measures explains about a fifth of the difference between perceived and actual segregation. This may be because district characteristics are highly correlated with the actual level of segregation in a given school district. For ease of interpretation, we also present demographic coefficients in Figure 5.

[Figure 5]

Effect of Information Treatment

Treatment effect estimates of our informational stimulus are presented in Table 4. We do not observe a statistically significant treatment effect of information on parents' general attitudes or policy preferences towards school segregation. As previously noted, point estimates predicting change in support measured by the two indices illustrate treatment effects in standard deviation units, while point estimates both for additional minutes of travel time and tax increase increments are presented in minutes and in dollars, respectively.

[Table 4]

In addition to considering the main treatment effects, we next turn to considering the precision and practical implications of the null treatment effect, following recommendations from both Aberson (2002) and Jacob et al. (2019). When considering general attitudes towards reducing school segregation, we observe an estimated effect size of 0.06 SD, indicating that treatment groups report slightly more positive feelings towards reducing school segregation than control groups, though this effect is not statistically significant. The confidence interval around this effect ranges from -0.02 to 0.13 SD, which suggests that it would be unlikely that the effect size would be larger than 0.02 SD favoring the control group, or larger than 0.13 SD favoring the treatment group. In practical terms, this indicates that any expected effects of the information treatment would be substantively considered quite small, even if they were to reach the upper bound of 0.13 SD. Given that these preferences were measured immediately after treatment, we

would also reasonably expect them to fade over time. In a real-world context, it would be unlikely for respondents to receive this type of information just before making key decisions about local policies or schools, so the practical effect of information treatments is likely even smaller than estimates observed here.

For the policy index, which measures preferences for a number of policies that might reasonably be expected to reduce local school segregation, the estimated treatment effect size is 0.04 SD, with the 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.05 to 0.12 SD. Once again, these effect sizes indicate at most a substantively small treatment effect influencing policy preferences. To put these effect sizes in context, consider, for example, the 0.61 SD difference in attitudes towards school segregation between Democrats and Republicans in our sample. Though the gap by income is smaller, there is still a 0.33 SD difference in attitudes between respondents with above-median household incomes compared to those below the U.S. median. In context, then, even the upper bound of the treatment effects are unlikely to have a meaningful substantive impact on changing general attitudes and policy preferences for reducing school segregation.

For the measures predicting tax increases, we can also consider estimates from Basile (2012), who estimate that the total cost of additional per-pupil expenditure to halve amounts of school segregation is approximately \$900 per pupil per year. The bounds on the estimated treatment effect of information in our study ranges from a \$190 *decrease* in willingness to raise taxes to fund the costs of desegregated schools to a \$115 increase. At best, this is about one-tenth of the estimated costs to halve the amount of school segregation (though of course these estimates do not reflect the ways in which the cost of reducing segregation varies across communities due to differences in transportation and other costs).

In addition, we investigate heterogeneity in the effect of the information treatment for those who over- and underestimate local school segregation levels. These results are displayed in Table 5. Though the point-estimate on the effect of the information treatment on overestimators' policy preferences is at first significant at the p<0.05 level, we can no longer detect this effect once accounting for multiple hypotheses using either the false discovery rate or the more conservative Bonferroni correction. In both cases, the p-value on this term is above the conventional significance level. From this, we conclude that there is no detectable evidence of a statistically significant or substantively meaningful shift in either attitudes or policy preferences as a result of the information treatment.

[Table 5]

DISCUSSION

This study investigates beliefs about school segregation, as well as preferences towards reducing it, among parents of school-aged children. More specifically, we explore the role of (mis)perceptions in shaping general attitudes and policy preferences on the issue of school segregation and if information designed to correct inaccurate beliefs might have a causal effect on these views.

Descriptive results suggest that parents have highly inaccurate understandings of the segregation levels in their school districts. In fact, parents correctly perceived school segregation in their district only about one sixth of the time, no better than a random guess between the six categories of segregation we provide. Parental perceptions were not just inaccurate, but also tend to be overly optimistic with respect to economic school integration. On average, parents underestimate the amount of segregation in their child's district. Indeed, the most common

parental response is that their district had very little or no segregation. This was true across all categories of race/ethnicity, income, political party affiliation, and education; the most popular response for parents when asked for their perception of segregation was that their district had little to no economic segregation. In reality, however, these perceptions are inaccurate, as economic school segregation is high nationally and has been rising over time (Reardon and Owens 2014).

Moreover, we also observe substantial heterogeneity in terms of the differences in respondent's *perceived* and *actual* local segregation levels. For example, high-income parents tended to underestimate their local levels of economic school segregation, while low-income parents tended to overestimate. However, in spite of inaccurate beliefs about school segregation, tailored information on the actual levels of segregation in one's school district did not significantly change either general attitudes or policy preferences around economic school segregation. In practical terms, even the upper bound of the estimated treatment effects would constitute only a small change, given the large baseline differences in opinions, attitudes, and preferences around school segregation, and would be unlikely to move the needle in any meaningful way. Together, these findings highlight both (1) that there are persistent misconceptions about segregation and (2) that correcting misperceptions alone does not appear to influence preferences.

Our experimental results are largely consistent with a framework where, at least on the issue of economic school segregation, Americans are tolerant of inequality or at best ambivalent towards it (McCall 2013). This aligns with a portion of the prior literature on income inequality attitudes and preferences. For example, though Kuziemko et al. (2015), which included an information treatment on income inequality in the U.S., found statistically significant effects of

information treatments on policy preferences, the magnitudes of these point estimates were small and had little practical significance in the context of vast contemporary income inequality. In both their study and in the present study, the information treatment is not subtle; not only do we provide tailored information about the segregation context for each respondent, but our study also provides a research finding on the consequences of segregation. In particular, this paragraph on research findings indicates both that segregation substantially harms the educational outcomes of disadvantaged children, but also that prior evidence suggests that high-income children are unlikely to face academic consequences if segregation were to be reduced. In spite of this information and the apparent disconnect between beliefs and actual observed levels of segregation, parents do not appear to be responsive to this information when considering both their attitudes and their policy preferences. This suggests a general tolerance towards the issue of school segregation that is unchanged by updated information.

Why aren't parents more receptive to information about school segregation? While the mechanisms underlying these patterns are unclear, the prior literature on both perceptions of inequality and perceptions of school segregation suggest that parents may not be amenable to policies that they worry will affect their self-interests (Holme 2002; Pride 2000). Given that achievement gaps emerge not only due to the circumstances of disadvantaged children, but also because of opportunity hoarding by advantaged families (Owens 2018), one possible explanation for the null effects may be parents' self-interests. Relatedly, parents may not fully believe information treatments. For example, though our treatment included clear information about the likely harms of school segregation, and the potential for outcomes where all children's outcomes could either be improved (as in the case of low-income children) or not harmed (for high-income children), this information may not be enough to overcome longstanding fears about the

consequences of desegregation for advantaged children. Given these findings, interventions beyond the provision of information are likely to be needed to substantially shift preferences in a way that might encourage parents to develop preferences for reducing segregation. Finally, it may be that parents express their views about inequality and redistribution through channels not captured by our survey (McCall 2013).

In shedding light on both parental conceptions of levels of school segregation in their area and on how preferences for school segregation-reducing policies respond to informational stimuli on the actual levels and consequences of school segregation, our work has several important implications. First, we add to the large body of literature on how attitudes and perceptions of social class produce unequal social and economic outcomes (Billingham and Hunt 2016; Bobo et al. 2012; Gaddis 2015; Krysan et al. 2009). Second, we build on experimental and theoretical literatures on elasticity of policy preferences to information (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2018; Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015; McCall 2013; McCall et al. 2017). Finally, by focusing on parental opinions of school segregation, we contribute to literature on the underlying causes of school segregation (Billingham and Hunt 2016; Jacobs 2011; Saporito 2017). In addition, our results may be useful to policymakers and educational administrators interested in understanding parental attitudes and preferences when adjudicating between many competing segregation-related policies.

However, there are a number of limitations to our study that warrant additional consideration and discussion. First, while survey experiments are a useful tool for testing hypotheses that might be difficult to test in real-world scenarios, there are very real differences between what people *report* valuing and what they *actually* value when making decisions. This consideration extends not only to the choice of schools for children, but also to a wide variety of

other important decisions that may have ramifications on inequality, such as choice of neighborhood (Burdick-Will et al. 2020; Holme 2002; Schneider and Buckley 2002). It is therefore possible that any responses, or the lack thereof, might suffer from social desirability bias. However, recent research on demand effects in survey experiments has indicated that respondents appear to have a very limited ability to adjust behaviors based on their understanding of the experiment's purpose (Mummolo and Peterson 2019). In addition, hypothetical survey responses are in fact quite similar to observed real-world behaviors (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). For this reason, though differences in stated and revealed choices may still limit the external validity of these experiments, we believe that it is less likely that respondents changed their stated answers in order to meet researcher expectations. Finally, school segregation is exceedingly complex to measure and describe. For example, between-school and between-district measures of segregation differ, as does school segregation depending on the age of the schoolchildren in question (i.e., there may be less segregation at the high school level if a district only has one high school but many elementary schools). The provided measures were designed to be straightforward and simple to understand for our survey respondents, and future studies might consider a longer experiment with more technical and nuanced details on segregation to elicit different segregation-related stratification beliefs.

Several aspects of our results should inform future work on these topics. First, because that we observe only parental attitudes and policy preferences (but not *why* and *how* parents form these preferences), follow-up studies might include a qualitative component to better understand the ways in which parents process and interpret information about segregation in their school districts. Moreover, given widespread opposition to busing and similar policies designed to

reduce segregation, future studies might use tailored information treatments to more specifically address misconceptions of busing and other segregation-reducing policies as policy failures. Finally, it may also be the case that a stronger information treatment could do more to address views on inequality. For example, targeted information on how the respondents themselves and their children might be negatively affected by segregation (or could stand to benefit from desegregation) may be a more effective approach to moving views on inequality and affecting general tolerances towards the issue. As such, future research should investigate the extent to which self-interest specifically is a mechanism underlying the patterns that we observe.

RESEARCH ETHICS

This study was approved by the institutional review board of the authors' home institution (prior to and during the time the research was conducted). Participants gave their informed consent prior to participation and all necessary steps have been taken to protect participants' confidentiality.

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RUNNING HEAD: EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON PREFERENCES FOR SEGREGATION

TABLES Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Lucid survey sample.

	Full Sample		Treatment		Contr	ol	Difference
	Mean/Prop.	SD	Mean/Prop.	SD	Mean/Prop.	SD	p-value
Female	.45		.44		.45		.92
Age	41	12	41.10	11.72	40.36	11.33	.20
Race/Ethnicity							
White	.78		.80		.76		.06
Black	.12		.11		.13		.15
American Indian / Alaska Native	.01		.01		.02		.19
Asian / Pacific Islander	.05		.05		.05		.61
Other / Prefer not to answer	.04		.03		.05		.17
Hispanic (non-exclusive)	.13		.12		.14		.12
Household Income (\$1000)	65.69	49.09	67.62	48.74	63.79	49.39	.12
Education - Simplified Categories							
Less than High School / None of the Above	.09		.09		.10		.48
High School	.27		.28		.27		.98
2-Year Degree	.07		.08		.06		.13
4-Year Degree	.26		.25		.27		.32
Graduate Degree or More	.31		.31		.30		.60
Political Party							
Democrat	.51		.50		.52		.54
Republican	.29		.30		.28		.31
Independent	.20		.20		.20		.70
Region							
Northeast	.23		.24		.21		.28
Midwest	.19		.20		.18		.32
South	.38		.36		.40		.13
West	.20		.20		.21		.80
School District Measures							

NonPoor-Poor Difference Exposure to FRL Students	.14	.11	.14	.11	.14	.11	.36
Free/Reduced-Price Lunch Eligible	.58	.20	.57	.20	.59	.20	.12
District Enrollment (1000 students)	79.45	139.44	81.58	141.87	77.35	137.05	.54
Number of Charter Schools in the District	21.04	38.51	20.90	38.39	21.17	38.66	.89
Per Pupil Total Expenditure (\$1000)	14.15	5.72	14.03	5.72	14.26	5.73	.41
Per-Pupil Total Revenue (\$1000)	13.86	5.27	13.74	5.23	13.98	5.32	.38
District SES	08	.81	06	.80	10	.82	.32
Outcomes							
Segregation Guess	2.79	1.75	2.80	1.74	2.78	1.76	
Difference Guess - Actual Segregation	13	2.06	11	2.08	15	2.04	
Attitude Index	01	1.00	.03	.98	01	1.00	
Policy Index	01	1.00	.00	1.01	01	1.00	
Additional Travel Time (Minutes)	4.15	57.62	5.16	22.66	3.15	78.09	
Tax Increase (Dollars)	571.46	1608.55	544.23	1462.68	598.39	1741.33	
Observations	162	3	807	,	816		

Note: Respondents' guesses of their local segregation levels ranged from 1 (corresponding to level A in Figure 2) to 6 (corresponding to level F). Difference column displays t-tests of difference in demographic characteristics between control and treatment groups; none are statistically significant at the 5% level. District SES indicates district socioeconomic status.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(ד)	(0) hibh a	tional	(\prime)	(0)
	Attitud	e Index	Policy	Index	Trave	l Time	Tax Increase	
Female	-0.05	-0.04	-0.14*	-0.14	-2.10	-3.41	-215.22	-192.20
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(4.05)	(4.89)	(131.10)	(129.49)
Black	0.10	0.05	0.07	0.04	-17.10	-16.05	496.99	446.18
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(20.32)	(19.45)	(260.05)	(277.18)
American Indian / Alaska Native	0.38	0.31	0.15	0.08	16.58	19.19	284.42	208.49
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(10.22)	(12.00)	(655.46)	(664.99)
Asian / Pacific Islander	-0.17	-0.15	-0.24	-0.21	5.69	5.08	-99.91	-81.11
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(7.23)	(7.16)	(205.07)	(209.75)
Other / Prefer not to answer	-0.02	-0.04	-0.13	-0.12	0.67	-0.01	-269.13	-293.46
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(5.61)	(5.64)	(328.68)	(330.54)
Hispanic	0.02	-0.00	0.12	0.10	5.47	6.75	452.56	447.09
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(4.88)	(5.52)	(272.81)	(280.92)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.34	0.25	-9.25*	-8.02
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(4.55)	(4.59)
Household Income (Log)	0.07*	0.06	0.08*	0.07*	3.53	4.45	68.59	60.13
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(3.18)	(3.93)	(57.02)	(58.77)
High School	0.14	0.13	0.30*	0.30*	24.40	24.50	-250.48	-244.41
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(26.34)	(26.40)	(212.19)	(212.88)
2-Year Degree	0.15	0.14	0.17	0.16	20.25	21.62	-311.54	-268.46
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(23.19)	(24.17)	(241.48)	(238.98)
4-Year Degree	0.25*	0.25*	0.42**	0.42**	20.32	21.94	-186.53	-184.04
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(23.09)	(24.13)	(225.51)	(226.03)
Graduate Degree or More	0.75***	0.71***	0.81***	0.78***	17.81	20.95	82.15	46.14
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(18.71)	(21.05)	(240.54)	(246.36)
Republican	-0.43***	-0.41***	-0.40***	-0.39***	0.69	0.73	-93.31	-88.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(4.04)	(4.06)	(135.06)	(132.42)
Independent	-0.51***	-0.49***	-0.52***	-0.50***	-14.04	-13.85	103.42	101.81
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(15.92)	(15.73)	(198.29)	(196.09)
Midwest	-0.19	0.01	-0.23*	-0.06	10.79	1.80	- 566.36**	-152.49

Table 2: Regression results predicting attitudes and preferences based on individual- and district-level covariates (control group).

	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(16.50)	(9.19)	(194.46)	(191.26)
South	-0.14	0.04	-0.05	0.09	8.81	3.42	-470.91*	-107.29
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(14.36)	(9.31)	(193.77)	(204.60)
West	-0.11	0.07	-0.13	-0.02	8.36	4.21	-411.08	10.02
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(12.05)	(8.67)	(223.20)	(266.68)
Controls Included	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.265	0.280	0.281	0.296	0.029	0.035	0.057	0.069
Adjusted R-squared	0.249	0.258	0.265	0.275	0.008	0.006	0.037	0.040
Observations	816	816	816	816	816	816	816	816

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted reference categories are as follows (in order): male, White, household income below median, less than high school education, Democrat, Northeastern region. Included district-level controls are: nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to free/reduced-price lunch-eligible student (FRL students), percent FRL, district enrollment (log), number of charter schools, per-pupil total expenditure, per-pupil total revenue, and district socioeconomic status (SES). *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3: Regression results predicting perceptions of segregation levels and differences between perceived and actual segregation.

Perception of Segregation Level Difference Perceived & Actual Segregation Female 0.04 0.06 0.23* 0.06 Black 0.45** 0.40** 0.00 0.27 Merican Indian / Alaska Native 0.15 0.17 0.16 American Indian / Alaska Native -0.15 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 Merican Indian / Alaska Native -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 Asian / Pacific Islander -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 Mori / Prefer not to answer 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.30 Mispanic -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female 0.04 0.06 0.23* 0.06 Black (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) American Indian / Alaska Native -0.15 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 American Indian / Alaska Native -0.15 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 American Indian / Alaska Native -0.15 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 Asian / Pacific Islander -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) Other / Prefer not to answer 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.30 (0.27) (0.31) (0.27) Hispanic -0.29 -0.30 -0.48** -0.30 (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 High School 0.09 0.09 0.05 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)		Perce Segrega	ption of tion Level	Difference & Actual S	Perceived Segregation
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Female	0.04	0.06	0.23*	0.06
Black 0.45** 0.40** 0.00 0.27 American Indian / Alaska Native (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) American Indian / Alaska Native -0.15 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 (0.34) (0.34) (0.51) (0.38) Asian / Pacific Islander -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) Other / Prefer not to answer 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.30 (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.27) Hispanic -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Household Income (Log) -0.08 -0.08 -0.29*** -0.08 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18)		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Black	0.45**	0.40**	0.00	0.27
American Indian / Alaska Native -0.15 -0.17 -0.28 -0.11 (0.34)(0.34)(0.51)(0.38)Asian / Pacific Islander -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 (0.20)(0.19)(0.23)(0.20)Other / Prefer not to answer 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.30 (0.27)(0.27)(0.31)(0.27)Hispanic -0.29 -0.30 -0.48^{**} -0.30 Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 Household Income (Log) -0.08 -0.08 -0.29^{***} -0.08 High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 2-Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	American Indian / Alaska Native	-0.15	-0.17	-0.28	-0.11
Asian / Pacific Islander -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 (0.20)(0.19)(0.23)(0.20)Other / Prefer not to answer 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.30 (0.27)(0.27)(0.31)(0.27)Hispanic -0.29 -0.30 $-0.48**$ -0.30 (0.15)(0.15)(0.15)(0.18)(0.16)Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 Huschold Income (Log) -0.08 -0.08 $-0.29***$ -0.08 High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18)(0.18)(0.20)(0.18)2-Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 (0.18)(0.19)(0.21)(0.19)Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19)(0.19)(0.21)(0.20)Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11)(0.11)(0.12)(0.11)		(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.51)	(0.38)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Asian / Pacific Islander	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.03
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$		(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.20)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Other / Prefer not to answer	0.35	0.33	0.27	0.30
Hispanic -0.29 -0.30 -0.48^{**} -0.30 Age (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 Household Income (Log) -0.08 -0.08 -0.20^{***} -0.08 High School (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)		(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.27)
Age (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) Household Income (Log) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 High School -0.08 -0.08 -0.20^{***} -0.08 High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 2-Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)	Hispanic	-0.29	-0.30	-0.48**	-0.30
Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 Household Income (Log) -0.08 -0.08 -0.20^{***} -0.08 High School (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 2-Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
Household Income (Log) -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.20^{***} -0.08 High School (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 2-Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High School (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) High School 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 2-Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) 4-Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)	Household Income (Log)	-0.08	-0.08	-0.20***	-0.08
High School 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 2 -Year Degree -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) 4 -Year Degree 0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.09 (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	High School	0.09	0.09	0.15	0.14
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2-Year Degree	-0.05	-0.02	0.05	0.04
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	4-Year Degree	0.05	0.06	-0.10	0.09
Graduate Degree or More -0.06 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 (0.19)(0.19)(0.21)(0.20)Republican0.040.060.170.10(0.11)(0.11)(0.12)(0.11)	-	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) Republican 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.10 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)	Graduate Degree or More	-0.06	-0.06	-0.33	-0.04
Republican0.040.060.170.10(0.11)(0.11)(0.12)(0.11)	-	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)
$(0.11) \qquad (0.12) \qquad (0.11)$	Republican	0.04	0.06	0.17	0.10
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)

Independent	0.04	0.06	0.20	0.13
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Midwest	0.02	0.25	0.43**	-0.26
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.21)
South	0.02	0.24	-0.22	-0.28
	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.23)
West	0.11	0.39	-0.20	-0.25
	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.24)
NonPoor-Poor Difference Exposure to FRL Students		0.18		
-		(0.64)		
Percent FRL		-0.01		-0.50
		(0.52)		(0.55)
District Enrollment (Log)		0.01		-0.53***
		(0.05)		(0.04)
Number of Charter Schools		-0.00		0.01**
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Per-Pupil Total Expenditure		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Per-Pupil Total Revenue		-0.00		-0.00
-		(0.00)		(0.00)
District SES		-0.11		-0.13
		(0.13)		(0.13)
Constant	3.77***	3.16***	1.74**	6.05***
	(0.51)	(0.72)	(0.60)	(0.72)
R-squared	0.019	0.024	0.069	0.228
Adjusted R-squared	0.009	0.009	0.059	0.217
Observations	1623	1623	1623	1623

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted reference categories are as follows (in order): male, White, less than high school education, Democrat, Northeastern region. District SES indicates district socioeconomic status.

RUNNING HEAD: EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON PREFERENCES FOR SEGREGATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Attitud	e Index	Policy	Index	Addition Ti	al Travel me	Tax In	icrease
Treatment Effect	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.04	2.01	1.58	-54.17	-37.55
95% Confidence Interval	(0.05) [-0.06. 0.13]	(0.04) [-0.02 0.13]	(0.05) [-0.08. 0.11]	(0.04) [-0.05. 0.12]	(2.85) [-3.5 7.6]	(2.54) [-3.4 6.5]	(79.79) [-210.7 102 3]	(77.65) [-189.9 114 8]
7570 Confidence Interval	0.15]	0.15]	0.11]	0.12]	7.0]	0.5]	102.5	114.0
Observations	1623	1623	1623	1623	1623	1623	1623	1623
Controls Included	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 4: Experimental treatment effects of information on the general attitudes and policy preferences regarding segregation.

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Included respondent-level controls are: gender, race/ethnicity, age, income (log), education, political party, and geographic region. Included district-level controls are: nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to free/reduced-price lunch-eligible student (FRL students), percent FRL, district enrollment (log), number of charter schools, per-pupil total expenditure, per-pupil total revenue, and district socioeconomic status (SES).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
	Attitude Index	Policy Index	Additional Travel Time	Tax Increase		
	Underestimators (<i>n</i> =747)					
Treatment Effect (Underestimator)	0.01	-0.06	5.27	-31.03		
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(5.31)	(120.82)		
	Overestimators (<i>n</i> =876)					
Treatment Effect (Overestimator)	0.10	0.12*	-1.60	-36.73		
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(1.73)	(102.93)		

Table 5: Heterogeneity of treatment effects (n=1623).

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Included respondent-level controls are: gender, race/ethnicity, age, income (log), education, political party, and geographic region. Included district-level controls are: nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to free/reduced-price lunch-eligible student (FRL students), percent FRL, district enrollment (log), number of charter schools, per-pupil total expenditure, per-pupil total revenue, and district socioeconomic status (SES).

RUNNING HEAD: EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON PREFERENCES FOR SEGREGATION

FIGURES





Figure 2: Experimental item where respondents indicate their perception of their own school district's school segregation.



Figure 3: Associations between gender, race/ethnicity, political party, income, education, and region and general attitudes and policy preferences regarding segregation (control group).



• Attitude Index • Policy Index

Note: Full regression results can be seen in Table 2. Included district-level controls are: nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to free/reduced-price lunch-eligible student (FRL students), percent FRL, district enrollment (log), number of charter schools, per-pupil total expenditure, per-pupil total revenue, and district SES.



Figure 4: Perceived and actual levels of local school segregation.

Figure 5: Accuracy of perceived levels of local school segregation, by gender, race/ethnicity, political party, income, education, and region.



Note: Full regression results can be seen in Table 3. Included district-level controls are: nonpoor-poor difference in exposure to free/reduced-price lunch-eligible student (FRL students), percent FRL, district enrollment (log), number of charter schools, per-pupil total expenditure, per-pupil total revenue, and district SES.

Appendix

A1. Tables and Figures

Table A1: Tabulation of school district intersections for each U.S. zip code.

Number of District Intersections Per Zip Code	Total Zip Codes	Total U.S. Parents	Percent of U.S. Parents
1	16,175	23,173,180	43.77
2	9,023	15,519,609	29.31
3	4,673	8,860,239	16.74
4	1,804	3,760,401	7.1
5	518	1,231,475	2.33
6	120	324,390	0.61
7	23	50,265	0.09
8	6	11,473	0.02
9	2	13,183	0.02
Total	32,344	52,944,215	100

This table displays a tabulation of the number of U.S. zip codes and parents living in zip codes with a given number of school district intersections, ignoring any zip-parent intersections that contain less that contain only very few parents (i.e. less than 2% of a zip code's estimated parent population).

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Attitude Index	Policy Index	Additional Travel Time	Tax Increase
Treatment Effect	0.04	0.01	-3.09	-57.55
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(5.92)	(77.91)
95% Confidence Interval	[-0.05. 0.14]	[-0.08. 0.11]	[-14.7 8.5]	[-210.4 95.3]
Observations	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls Included	No	No	No	No

Table A2: Experimental treatment effects including dropped observations.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

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Figure A2: Accuracy of segregation category as a result of school district to zip code assignment procedure.





Figure A3: Standardized general attitudes and policy preferences regarding school segregation.

Figure A4: Supported increase in tax dollars and travel time to school (minutes) in order to reduce local economic school segregation.



A2. Experimental Items

i) <u>Segregation Information (All Respondents):</u>

Economic school segregation is the degree to which students from high-income families and students from low-income families in the **same school district** attend **different schools.** A school district has high levels of economic segregation when students tend to have schoolmates mainly of their own family income level; that is, high-income students tend to go to schools with more high-income students and low-income students tend to go to schools with more low-income students.

For example, the figure below shows two school districts, Fairview and Centerville. Each district has just two schools, School 1 and School 2. The economic composition of each school is represented by a row of students, with the top row representing School 1 and the bottom row representing School 2. Here, we define student income using eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch at school.





Both Fairview and Centerville are comprised of half low-income students and half high-income students. However, they differ in how students are assigned to schools. Fairview represents a school district with no segregation (low-income and high-income students are equally distributed among the two schools). On the other hand, Centerville represents a school district with total segregation (low-income and high-income students attend entirely separate schools). While it is possible for a school district to be totally segregated (like Centerville) or not segregated at all (like Fairview), most school districts are somewhere in between.

- 1. Using the information in the figure <u>below</u>, which school district is more segregated?
 - o Springfield
 - o Dayton



We can graphically represent a school district's segregation in multiple ways. For example, the two images displayed below both show the same district and the same amount of school segregation.



- 2. We are interested in how much schools are segregated in the public school district that children in your neighborhood attend. Of the example districts A through F below, which do you think corresponds to the amount of economic school segregation in **your school district**?
 - o District A
 - o District B
 - o District C
 - o District D
 - o District E
 - o District F



ii) Information Stimuli (Treatment Condition Only)

Your District's Segregation

You responded that District [] most closely matches the economic segregation in your district.

In reality, based on your zip code, the actual level of economic school segregation in **your school district most closely matches District [] below.**



Consequences of Segregation

Economic school segregation has negative consequences for low-income students. Lowincome students in less segregated districts perform better on standardized tests and are more likely to graduate high school than low-income students in more segregated districts. Furthermore, on average, U.S. school districts have become increasingly more economically segregated over time.

Fortunately, research suggests that reducing economic segregation would not hurt highincome students. High-income students perform similarly on standardized tests and graduate high school at similar rates in districts with both low and high levels of economic segregation.

iii) <u>Self-Reported Outcomes (All Conditions)</u>

- 3. How important of an issue do you think the reduction of school segregation is in your local area?
 - o Not at all important
 - o Slightly important
 - o Somewhat important
 - o Very important
 - o Extremely important
- When attending school in-person, about how much time, in minutes, do your children spend traveling to school in the morning? [number entry]

Imagine that administrators in your local school district want to reduce school segregation and are considering several plans.

[All items below in randomized order]

5. With one of the hypothetical new plans, administrators are considering changing attendance zones to reduce segregation. Under this plan, some children might have to attend different schools within their district. Sometimes, this is the school that is closest to their house, but sometimes it is a bit further away.

If this plan were to pass in your district, what is the furthest, in minutes, that you would allow your child to travel to school?

[Entry form] Minutes

6. How likely are you to support changing attendance boundaries to reduce school segregation?

- o Not at all likely
- o Slightly likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely
- 7. Imagine that, under a different potential plan, administrators hope to change the schools that some students attend so that there is less segregation. Under this plan, the proportion of low-income students in your child's school will be closer to the district average.

Consider your child who attends school closest to your home. If your child currently attends a school with very few students from low-income families, it is likely that there will be as high as a 20% increase in the number of students from low-income families in your child's school. If your child currently attends a school with a large number of students from low-income families, it is likely that there will be up to a 20% decrease in the number of low-income students in your child's school.

How likely would you be to support this plan?

- o Not at all likely
- o Slightly likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely
- 8. Imagine that administrators in your district are considering opening a new magnet school, which will offer high-quality academic programs to students in your district and in nearby districts. Such a policy would make it so that students are not necessarily attending the school closest to them. Approximately half of the students in the school will be from low-income families. How likely would you be to send your child to this school?
 - o Not at all likely
 - o Slightly likely
 - o Somewhat likely
 - o Very likely
 - o Extremely likely
- 9. Imagine that administrators in your local government have decided to change the school district budget so that more money will be used to pay for the costs of reducing local school segregation. This money will come from other parts of the school district budget, such as teaching aides, sports, field trips, and/or extracurricular activities. How likely would you be to support this plan?
 - o Not at all likely
 - o Slightly likely
 - o Somewhat likely

- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely
- 10. To pay for the costs of reducing local school segregation without reducing funding for other school district budget areas, imagine that local officials have proposed a raise in property taxes in your area. Imagine that the exact amount of the property taxes increase has yet to be decided and the officials has asked for your input. How much, if any, would you feel is a reasonable annual increase?

[text entry]

- 11. How positive or negative do you feel about the following statement? *The government has a responsibility to reduce school segregation.*
 - o Extremely negative
 - o Somewhat negative
 - o Slightly negative
 - o Equally positive and negative
 - o Slightly positive
 - o Somewhat positive
 - o Extremely positive
- 12. How likely are you to support reducing school segregation in your local area?
 - o Not at all likely
 - o Slightly likely
 - o Somewhat likely
 - o Very likely
 - o Extremely likely
- 13. In general, how negative or positive do you feel about plans to reduce school segregation?
 - o Extremely negative
 - o Somewhat negative
 - o Slightly negative
 - o Equally positive and negative
 - o Slightly positive
 - o Somewhat positive
 - o Extremely positive
- 14. Imagine you and your family are moving to a new town. When deciding what neighborhood to live in, how likely are you to consider the economic diversity of your child's school?

- o Not at all likely
- o Slightly likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely

15. How much of a problem is economic school segregation in your school district?

- o Not at all
- o A little
- o Somewhat
- o Quite a bit
- o A great deal